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Abstract. David Lewis (1986) criticizes moderate views of 
composition on the grounds that a restriction on composition must 
be vague, and vague composition leads, via a precisificational 
theory of vagueness, to an absurd vagueness of existence. I show 
how to resist this argument. Unlike the usual resistance, however, I 
do not jettison precisificational views of vagueness. Instead, I blur 
the connection between composition and existence that Lewis 
assumes. On the resulting view, in troublesome cases of vague 
composition, there is an object, which definitely exists, about 
which it is vague whether the relevant borderline parts compose it. 
 
I think that there are objects—my chair, for example—that are composed of 
several material objects. But I deny that there is anything composed of my nose 
and the Eiffel tower. So I’m a moderate about composition, since I think that there 
is a restriction on composition, but not a total restriction. Furthermore, I think that 
the restriction is more or less what you would intuitively take it to be: noses are 
in; towers are in; tower-noses are out. 
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David Lewis (1986) claims that this view is committed to the possibility of an 
incoherent sort of vague existence, and he concludes that composition is in fact 
unrestricted.1 As he puts it: 
 
The question whether composition takes place in a given case, 
whether a given class does or does not have a mereological sum, 
can be stated in a part of language where nothing is vague. 
Therefore it cannot have a vague answer. There is such a thing as 
the sum, or there isn’t. It cannot be said that, because the 
desiderata for composition are satisfied to a borderline degree, 
there sort of is and sort of isn’t. What is this thing such that it sort 
of is so, and sort of isn’t, that there is any such thing? No 
restriction on composition can be vague. But unless it is vague, it 
cannot fit the intuitive desiderata. So no restriction on composition 
can serve the intuitions that motivate it. So restriction would be 
gratuitous. (213) 
 
To say that “there sort of is and sort of isn’t” a sum of the relevant class is just to 
say 
 
(1)  It is vague whether there is something that is the sum of that class.  
 
To say that there is a thing of which “it sort of is so, and sort of isn’t, that there is 
any such thing” is to say 
 
(2) There is something of which it is vague whether there is any such thing. 
 
Thesis (2) is of course absurd. If something is red, then it is not vague whether it 
is red. Similarly, if there is such a thing as x, then it is not vague whether there is 
any such a thing as x. Lewis thinks that (1) entails the absurd (2). Why does 
Lewis think this? 
                                                 
1  Also see Ted Sider (2001, 120 – 32) for an elaboration and defense of the argument. Sider 
extends the argument to support four-dimensionalism as well as unrestricted composition. The 
argument has received a great deal of attention in the literature. For example, see van Inwagen 
(1990, section 19), Markosian (1998a; 2004), Hawley (2002), Koslicki (2003), Merricks 
(2005), Hawthorne (2006), Nolan (2006), and Smith (2006). 
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An example helps. Consider a sparsely populated world containing some 
mereological simples that are arranged in such a way that, on a moderate view, it 
is vague whether they compose anything. (Perhaps they are not quite unified 
enough to definitely compose a cloud of simples on a moderate view.) Call this 
the case of the cloudishly arranged simples. Lewis thinks that whether there is 
anything in addition to the simples in this case depends on whether composition 
has occurred. As a result, Lewis thinks, since the moderate accepts (1), and so 
holds that it is vague whether composition has occurred, he must also agree that it 
is vague whether there is anything in addition to the simples. But Lewis holds 
that, if it is vague whether there is anything in addition to the simples, then there 
is something about which it is vague whether it is a thing in addition to the 
simples. (This is an instance of the principle ∇∃xφ → ∃x∇φ, where ‘∇’ is read ‘it 
is vague whether’.) But that is to say that there is a thing about which it is vague 
whether there is any such thing, which is the absurd (2). 
So the argument is that (1) entails (2) in this sort of case. Specifically, this is a 
case in which the moderate will say that none of the candidate composers is 
definitely a part of a composite for which they (jointly) are candidate composers. 
For example, if it is vague whether a board and a stump compose a table, then 
neither the board nor the stump is definitely part of a table for which they are 
candidate composers. Similarly, none of the simples is definitely a part of any 
object for which they are candidate composers. I call these homogeneous cases of 
borderline composition, since the candidate composers uniformly fail to definitely 
be a part of a composite for which they (jointly) are candidate composers. By 
contrast, consider some objects—this rock on the summit, that rock in the 
penumbral region, and lots of other stuff—which are (jointly) candidates for 
composing Kilimanjaro. The rock on the summit is definitely a part of 
Kilimanjaro, while the rock in the penumbral region is not definitely a part of it. 
In this sense, these objects are a heterogeneous case of borderline composition.  
Why must Lewis focus on the homogeneous cases? Suppose that some case is 
heterogeneous. Then there must be an object among the candidate composers that 
is definitely a part of the composite for which the objects are (jointly) candidate 
composers. But then that composite object definitely exists, and it’s existence 
clearly does not hinge on how the vagueness is resolved concerning whether the 
candidates compose anything. So it is only in homogeneous cases of borderline 
composition that it is at all plausible to say that the existence of a further object, 
in addition to the relevant candidates, depends on whether they compose 
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anything. Lewis’s argument, which requires such a claim, must therefore focus on 
cases that the moderate will regard as homogeneous. 
Moderates have typically responded to Lewis’s argument by denying the 
principle ∇∃xφ → ∃x∇φ, as well as the specific instance of it to which Lewis has 
to appeal.2 Moderates who respond in this way claim that denying this principle 
amounts to embracing a moderate kind of vague existence distinct from the 
absurd extreme sort of vague existence expressed by (2). 
The main problem with this reply is that it is incompatible with the widely held 
view that vagueness requires precisifications. According to this sort of view, 
whenever it is vague whether φ, there must be an expression in φ having multiple 
admissible precisifications—precise candidate extensions among which we are in 
some sense undecided. This sort of view, which Lewis was assuming to be 
correct, apparently requires the principle ∇∃xφ → ∃x∇φ. To see why, suppose 
that a precisificational theory is true, and suppose that we have ∇∃xφ. In that case, 
there must be some expression in ∃xφ with multiple candidate precisifications. 
Suppose that all such expressions are in φ. In that case, there are objects that are 
in some but not all candidate extensions for φ. But, on a precisificational theory, 
that is just equivalent to saying that ∃x∇φ, which is the consequent of the 
principle. As a result, if the principle fails, then it must be due to vagueness of the 
existential quantifier itself. So the existential quantifier would have multiple 
candidate extensions. But this is impossible. Since our intention in the present 
context is to quantify absolutely generally, the intended extension of the quantifier 
would definitely be the union of the candidates.3 It would thus have a definite 
extension after all. The present sort of response to Lewis’s argument is for this 
reason inconsistent with precisificational theories of vagueness. 
I want to suggest a different reply—one that is consistent with both a 
precisificational account of vagueness and a moderate view of composition. The 
reply preserves the principle ∇∃xφ → ∃x∇φ. As a result, in the cloudishly 
arranged simples case, I say that, since it is vague whether the class of simples has 
a sum, there is something—a proto-cloud, as I call it—about which it is vague 
whether it is the sum of the class. This object, the proto-cloud, definitely exists. 
But it is vague whether it is composed of the simples, and vague whether it has 
the simples as parts. The view therefore entails the vagueness of ‘composition’ 
(and ‘part’), contrary to Lewis. But this is not problematic in the way that Lewis 
                                                 
2  For example, see Peter Van Inwagen (ibid., sec. 19) and Katherine Hawley (2002). 
3  See Sider (2001, 128-9) for further discussion of this point. 
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thought. For Lewis rejected the vagueness of ‘composition’ in order to avoid the 
vagueness of ‘exists’ (and ‘there is’). But, according to the present reply, we may 
avoid the vagueness of ‘exists’ and ‘there is’ in another way: by refusing to assert 
the premise that whether there is a thing in addition to the simples depends on 
whether the simples compose anything. According to the resulting view, the 
boundary between non-being and being is not the boundary between non-
composition and composition. Rather, the boundary between non-being and being 
is the outer penumbral boundary for composition: the boundary between super-
definite cases of non-composition and everything else, where a super-definite case 
of non-composition is one such as the case of my nose and the Eiffel Tower—one 
in which it is definitely … definitely not the case that composition occurs, for any 
number of iterations of ‘definitely’. (I will say more about this boundary below.) 
This view says that there is an object in addition to the cloudishly arranged 
simples—a proto-cloud. I have found it helpful, in explaining the view, to answer 
some basic questions about the persistence conditions and location of proto-
clouds. This is what I will endeavor to do in the rest of the present section. Then, 
in the subsequent sections, I shall attempt to answer three objections to the view. 
Can the proto-cloud persist through condensation into a (definite) cloud? The 
answer is that, just as a proto-stellar cloud can become a star, a proto-cloud can 
become a cloud. The alternative, that the proto-cloud is at some point destroyed, 
and replaced with a cloud, seems implausible. Furthermore, this view would give 
rise to vague existence, since it would be vague when the replacement occurred, 
and so vague when the definite cloud came into existence.4 
What is the spatial location of the proto-cloud?5 Call this the location question. 
Since it is vague whether the proto-cloud is composed of the simples, we might 
expect it to be located in a region R about which it is vague whether R is 
                                                 
4  Interestingly, if proto-clouds can become clouds, then there seem to be counterexamples to 
the truth of many widely accepted scientific essentialist claims (i.e., claims of a posteriori 
necessity), such as the claim that, given a mass m of water, m necessarily has hydrogen atoms 
as parts. For, if we can find a case in which we have a proto-water-mass, that object will come 
to form a mass of water with which it is identical, even though we could not say of the proto-
mass that it has hydrogen atoms as parts. 
5  By ‘spatial location’ I mean what Parsons (2007) means by ‘exact spatial location’: L is the 
exact spatial location of x iff no part of L is free of x and every spatial region that does not 
overlap L is completely free of x. So my body is exactly located in a region shaped like a 
body, and has never been exactly located in a region shaped like an office, or in a region 
shaped like an arm. 
 
6 
 
composed of the locations of the simples. This, however, requires that regions of 
space can have borderline parts, and, in particular, that there is a region of space 
about which it is vague whether it is composed of the locations of the simples. It 
would also follow that composition is restricted for regions of space. For suppose 
that it is vague whether R is composed of the locations of the simples, and 
suppose that composition is unrestricted for regions of space. Then some region 
R* is composed of the locations of the simples. R and R* are distinct: R*, unlike 
R, is definitely composed of the locations of the simples. Distinct regions of space 
never have the same location. So R and R* do not have the same location. But, if 
R is composed of the locations of the simples, then it does have the same location 
as R*. So R is not composed of the locations of the simples, contrary to our 
supposition that it is vague whether it is composed of the locations of the simples. 
Proponents of this view, then, cannot accept that there is such a region of space as 
R*. They cannot accept, that is, that there is a region composed of the locations of 
the simples. As a result, they cannot accept unrestricted composition for regions 
of space. That seems to me a significant drawback, since unrestricted composition 
is plausible for regions of space (certainly more plausible than it is for objects like 
noses and towers).6 Furthermore, as we will see below (in the discussion of 
objection 1), this view does not fit well with my theory about proto-clouds. I will 
therefore set this answer to the location question aside.7 
A second answer to the location question is that it is vague whether there is a 
location L such that the proto-cloud is located at L. This answer can also be ruled 
out. For every cloud is definitely a material object. And, for every definite 
material object x, it is definitely the case that there is a location at which x is 
located. So, on the second answer to the location question, it follows that the 
proto-cloud is not a cloud, contrary to my hypothesis that it is vague whether it is 
a cloud. 
A third possible answer to the location question is that although the proto-cloud 
definitely has some location or other, there is no particular location about which it 
is definitely the case that the proto-cloud is located in that location. This view 
seems right for certain objects. For example, it seems true of Kilimanjaro: it is 
definitely the case that Kilimanjaro has some location or other, even though 
                                                 
6  Even van Inwagen (1981,1990), who denies the existence of almost all composite objects, 
appears to accept that there is a region of space corresponding to any set of spatial points. 
7  Thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this answer to the location 
question. And thanks to George Bealer for discussion of the argument of this paragraph. 
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(because of the vagueness of Kilimanjaro’s extent) there is no particular location 
of which it is definitely true that Kilimanjaro has that location. Here the idea is 
that some objects among some candidate composers of Kilimanjaro have more of 
a claim than others to being parts of Kilimanjaro. So some admissible 
precisifications count more candidates as parts, while some precisifications count 
fewer of the candidates as parts. As a result, some admissible precisifications 
count Kilimanjaro a little larger, some a little smaller. So it is vague which of 
many locations is the location of Kilimanjaro. 
Whether the proto-cloud is like Kilimanjaro in this respect depends on how we 
conceive of the case. If each of the simples has an equal claim to being a part of 
something, then any admissible precisification that allows one to be a part will 
allow them all to be parts. The admissible precisifications would then not 
generate a plurality of candidate locations for the proto-cloud. Rather, there would 
be just one candidate: the sum of the locations of the simples. On the other hand, 
if we conceive of the case so that, say, the simples near the center of the proto-
cloud are more unified than the simples around the edge (but still not unified 
enough to definitely compose anything) then the simples near the center might 
have a greater claim to parthood than the simples around the edge. In that case, 
there might well be multiple candidate locations for the proto-cloud, and the 
present answer to the location question—the answer which says that although the 
proto-cloud definitely has some location or other, there is no particular location 
about which it is definitely the case that the proto-cloud is located in that 
location—would be correct. 
 I thus favor a fourth answer to the location question: that the location of the 
proto-cloud is the sum of the locations of some of the simples. Then, depending 
on the case, the proto-cloud might be definitely located in the sum of the locations 
of all the simples, or it might be that there is no single sum of simple-locations of 
which it is definitely true that the proto-cloud is located in that location. It follows 
from this answer to the location question that being located in a sub-region of a 
thing’s location does not entail being a part of that thing. For, on this view, it can 
happen that a simple S is definitely located in a sub-region of the proto-cloud’s 
location, even though S is not definitely a part of the proto-cloud. Thus, I 
distinguish mereological overlap, which involves sharing parts, from 
spatiotemporal overlap, which involves mereological overlap of spatiotemporal 
locations.8 The proto-cloud overlaps the simples spatiotemporally, but does not 
                                                 
8  These must be distinguished by “two-thingers” about the lump and the statue. For if the lump 
and statue are distinct, then the arm seems to be a part of the statue but not the lump, since 
8 
 
definitely overlap them mereologically. This will be important in my reply to the 
first of the three objections which I will now address. 
 
First Objection: Simplicity 
 
In the cloudishly arranged simples case, is the proto-cloud itself a simple? If we 
define ‘simple’ as usual, so that it means ‘lacks proper parts’, then it is vague 
whether the proto-cloud is a simple, since it is vague whether it has any proper 
parts. But this is problematic. For, given our answer to the location question, the 
proto-cloud is located in a discontinuous region: some sum of the locations of the 
simples. And simples are definitely not located in discontinuous regions. So the 
proto-cloud would definitely not be a simple, contradicting what I said above, that 
it would be vague whether it is a simple. In this way, then, it might appear that my 
response to Lewis clashes with our intuitions about simplicity. This is the first 
objection. 
One reply to this objection is to define ‘simple’ as meaning ‘definitely lacks 
proper parts’ instead of just ‘lacks proper parts’. Then we can say that the proto-
cloud is definitely not simple (since it definitely does not definitely lack proper 
parts) while it is also vague whether it is composite. This is a natural way of 
defining ‘simple’ on the view I am suggesting. Alternatively, we might admit that 
‘simple’ means ‘lacks proper parts’ but that we easily confuse intuitions about 
simplicity with intuitions about definite simplicity, since indefinite simples are an 
exotic case. Either way, the view I am suggesting can handle these intuitions 
about simplicity. 
Of course, one might attempt to press the objection without appeal to the word 
‘simple’, and thus without any appeal to intuitions about simplicity. One might 
assert that, if an object is located in a discontinuous region, then it definitely has 
proper parts. But this claim simply begs the question. It is precisely my view that 
there can be an object which is located in a discontinuous region, but about which 
it is vague whether it has proper parts. An argument would be required to 
establish that any object so located must definitely have proper parts. 
                                                                                                                                     
extreme deformation of the arm seems to destroy the arm without destroying any part of the 
lump. Proponents of the possibility of interpenetrating matter (e.g., Sider 2001, p. 141, and 
McDaniel 2007a) are also committed to this distinction between spatiotemporal overlap and 
mereological overlap. And proponents of extended simples (e.g., Markosian 1998, Scala 
2002, Sider 2007, Parsons op. cit., and McDaniel 2007b) are committed to the idea that some 
matter can occupy a sub-region of an extended simple without being part of that simple. This 
seems close to the distinction between two kinds of overlap. 
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Perhaps the following argument is in the offing: 
 
1. Something that is located in a discontinuous region is partly located in 
each continuous sub-region thereof. 
2. Anything partly located in a given region has a part that is located in 
that region. 
3. Thus, anything located in a discontinuous region has a part. 
 
The argument equivocates between two senses of ‘partly located’. In one sense, to 
be partly located in a region R is to be located in a region of which R is a sub-
region. In another sense, to be partly located in a region is to have a part located 
in that region. Since my view distinguishes mereological and spatial overlap, I 
claim that these two senses are not definitely necessarily equivalent. When ‘partly 
located’ is understood in the first sense throughout, I refuse to assert the second 
premise, since the proto-cloud is partly located (in this sense) in various regions at 
which it has no definite part. When ‘partly located’ is understood in the second 
sense, on the other hand, I refuse to assert the first premise. 
Note that, if we accept the first answer to the location question—the answer 
which says that the proto-cloud is located in a (discontinuous) region about which 
it is vague whether that region is composed of the locations of the simples—then 
we cannot block this argument in this way. For it will no longer be true that the 
proto-cloud is located in a region of which the locations of the simples are proper 
sub-regions. Rather, it will be vague whether those locations are proper sub-
regions of the region in which the proto-cloud is located. And so we will no 
longer be able to say, as required by my response to the argument, that there is a 
sense in which the proto-cloud is partly located in those regions. Thus, the first 
answer to the location question leaves us with no adequate answer to this 
argument, which is one reason that I prefer my answer to the location question. 
Philosophers of a Humean bent will perhaps agree with me in rejecting the 
necessary equivalence of these two senses of ‘partly located’, as they might be 
suspicious of the resulting necessary connection between the mereological 
structure of objects and the mereological structure of the regions that they occupy. 
That is, they might be suspicious of the idea that there is a necessary connection 
between having a certain mereological structure, on the one hand, and being 
located in a region with that mereological structure, on the other. Indeed, several 
such philosophers have argued for the possibility of extended simples on the 
grounds that there is no such necessary connection between the structures of 
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objects and their locations.9 I do not have such Humean inclinations. But I will 
take allies where I can find them, even Humeans. 
 
Second Objection: Sharp Cut-off 
 
Suppose some simples slowly coalesce, starting from a state in which a moderate 
would say that it is definitely the case that there is nothing that the simples 
compose. At some point, the simples become unified enough that a moderate feels 
comfortable saying that there is something they compose. Noticing that the 
coalescence forms a sorites series, someone might argue as follows.  
 
Either there is a sharp boundary at which something in addition to 
the simples pops into existence, or else there is no such sharp 
boundary. But a sharp boundary here is intuitively problematic. 
And yet, if there is no sharp boundary, then we have accepted 
vague existence after all, so it will be vague whether there is an 
additional object at some stage in the coalescence, and so, by the 
principle ∇∃xφ → ∃x∇φ, there will be extreme vague existence, 
which we had intended to avoid. 
 
I have said that the line between non-being and being is the line between super-
definite cases of non-composition and the rest of the cases. According to the most 
plausible precisificational views of vagueness, this boundary is sharp. To see this, 
define an operator D*, following Williamson (1994, p. 160), like this: 
 
D*A ↔ DA & DDA & DDDA & … 
 
Then a case which is super-definite with respect to A is one in which this holds: 
 
 D*A 
 
Williamson points out that the definition of D* ensures the following: 
 
 D*A → DD*A 
 
                                                 
9  See Sider (2007), McDaniel (2007b). 
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That is, every super-definite case in which A is definitely super-definite: there can 
be no vagueness concerning super-definiteness.10 As a result, precisificational 
accounts are committed to a sharp line between super-definite cases and the rest.  
My view is that this is the line between being and non-being in a sorites series 
for composition. In other words, my view identifies the line between being and 
non-being with a sharp line to which the precisificationalist is antecedently 
committed. If the sharpness of this line is problematic, then it is a problem for 
precisificational views of vagueness, in which case Lewis’s attack on moderate 
composition fails, since his attack requires such a view of vagueness. 
Williamson suggests (p. 160) that the precisificationalist might to avoid the 
sharpness induced by D* by using a further operator, D!, to capture the vagueness 
of D*. For, given D!, we can say that the principle D*A → D!D*A fails. Iterating 
the process, we would need to introduce a hierarchy of operators: D!!, D!!!, etc.. 
This is because, for each operator, we would need a further operator in terms of 
which we can capture the vagueness of the last one. 
Williamson’s suggestion is problematic on several counts. I’ll mention two. 
First, it is difficult to see why the failure of D*A → D!D*A captures a sense in 
which D* is vague, especially given that D*A → DD*A remains true. The 
distinction between different operators seems to be an mere logician’s trick 
without any intuitive basis. Second, as Varzi (2007) points out, there are 
intelligible uses of ‘definitely’ that do not fit into the posited hierarchy of 
operators. For example, someone might say that everything God believes is 
definitely true. If, as the present reply has it, there is no one sense of ‘definitely’ 
in terms of which we can express all the facts about vagueness, then (given that 
God believes all the truths about vagueness) it is impossible to interpret this 
claim. Since the claim is perfectly intelligible, then, there must be one such sense 
of ‘definitely’. So it seems that Williamson’s first suggestion for avoiding the 
sharpness of D* is not promising. 
Williamson also suggests (p. 160-1) that the precisificationalist might attempt to 
avoid sharp lines by denying that almost anything is ever super-definitely true. 
But this is even less plausible than the first suggestion. For consider an utterly 
                                                 
10  The proof is simple. Suppose D*A. Then, by definition of D*, we have DA & DDA & …. 
That is, each conjunct of A & DA & … is definitely true. Thus, ever conjunct in DA & DDA 
& … is definitely true. So each conjunct of this conjunction is true in every admissible 
precisification. A conjunction is true in a precisification if its conjuncts are true in that 
precisification. So the conjunction itself is true in every admissible precisifiction. So our 
conjunction is definitely true: D(DA & DDA & …). By definition of D*, this is equivalent to 
DD*A. 
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hairless man. It is difficult to see how the sentence ‘That man is bald’ could be 
rendered false by prefixing it with any number of occurrences of D. The man is as 
bald as it is possible or conceivable for anything to be! 
Rather than accepting Williamson’s suggestion, the precisificationalist should 
instead simply embrace the result that D* imposes a sharp line (that is in principle 
unknowable) on a standard sorites series. Intuitively, there is no sharp line 
between (say) the red and the not red in a standard sorites series for ‘red’. And, 
intuitively, there is no sharp line between the definitely red and the not definitely 
red. But, when we iterate the ‘definitely’ operator a few more times, I think most 
of us will admit that we lose our grip on any sense of whether there is a sharp line. 
I have no intuition, for example, that that tells against a sharp line between the 
definitely definitely definitely definitely red and the not definitely definitely 
definitely definitely red. Accord with intuition cannot guide us in settling the 
issue; other virtues of the available theories must point the way. And one virtue of 
a precisificationalist theory which accepts a sharp line in the extreme case of an 
infinite stack of ‘definitely’ operators is that it allows us to avoid accepting weird 
objects like tower-noses. The appeal of such a theory is therefore undeniable, at 
least to commonsense moderates about composition, who like precisificational 
accounts but find tower-noses absurd.  
The resulting theory is not what is normally thought of as an epistemic approach 
to vagueness. For while it does posit an unknowable sharp line between the super-
definitely red and the non-super-definitely red in a standard sorites series, it does 
not posit an unknowable sharp line between the red and non-red, the bald and 
non-bald. It is the latter sort of unknowable sharp line that I take to be intuitively 
problematic, as I have just explained. The theory also does not provide an 
epistemic analysis of vagueness, as epistemic theories do. It is only similar to 
epistemic theories in that it embraces a kind of unknowable sharp line.11 
In any case, whether or not I have made a convincing case that this is the best 
version of precisificationalism, it seems clear that this version of 
precisificationalism is attractive on a number of counts and has not been ruled out. 
And so, contrary to Lewis, there are live versions of precisificationalism that are 
consistent with a commonsense moderate view of composition. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11  Williamson (ibid.) is the locus classicus for epistemic theories. 
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Third Objection: Explanatory Role of Composition 
 
One might respond to the foregoing by granting everything that I have said about 
what I call ‘composition’. But one might suggest that there has to be some other 
relation—call it shmomposition— which holds among the simples and the proto-
cloud. And one might say that it is because the simples shmompose the proto-
cloud that there is a further object in addition to the simples. And, because 
shmomposition is what explains the facts about existence we were interested in 
(e.g., facts about whether tower-noses exist), one might claim that shmomposition 
is the metaphysically interesting relation—the one that plays the metaphysically 
interesting explanatory role. If this view were right, I would have in effect 
changed the subject by focusing on the relation that I call ‘composition’. And, 
were we to refocus the debate on the metaphysically interesting relation of 
shmomposition, commonsense moderates about composition would be caught in a 
dilemma: we would either be forced to admit that the metaphysically interesting 
composition relation—shmomposition—is sharply restricted, or we would finally 
have to admit that it is unrestricted. Since sharp restrictions do not serve any 
intuitions we have about any composition-like relation, however, restriction is (as 
Lewis puts it) gratuitous. Thus, according to this objection, composition in the 
metaphysically relevant sense (i.e., shmomposition) is unrestricted after all. 
This approach is ideologically unparsimonious. For it is possible to define 
shmomposition, in my terms, as follows: 
 
the xs shmompose y ↔ ~ (the xs are a super-definite case of non-
composition with respect to y). 
 
And it seems, given the necessary truth of this biconditional, that the facts about 
the existence of composite objects can be explained at least as well by appeal to 
facts about composition in my sense (including facts about when it is vague 
whether composition occurs, and when it is vague whether it is vague, etc.). As a 
result, since my notion of composition is already needed to explain other 
intuitions, such as the intuition that it could be vague whether composition occurs, 
the most ideologically parsimonious approach is to accept the above biconditional 
as a definitional reduction of facts about shmomposition to facts about 
composition. Composition is in this sense a more fundamental relation than 
shmomposition, and thus is clearly of metaphysical interest, contrary to the 
present objection. 
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However, someone might insist that facts involving the relation I call 
composition are not well suited to explain all of the relevant facts. For example, 
someone might say that, if the proto-cloud is located in the region which is the 
sum of the locations of the simples, the facts about the location (and also the 
shape and mass) of the proto-cloud are not well explained by the fact that the 
proto-cloud has the simples as borderline parts. For, they might point out, the fact 
that Kilimanjaro has R as a borderline part does not entail that Kilimanjaro is 
located in sum of the regions inhabited by Kilimanjaro and R, since it is vague 
whether Kilimanjaro is located there.  
My reply is that what explains the facts about the location of the proto-cloud is 
not the fact that it has the simples as borderline parts. Rather, the explanatory fact 
is that the proto-cloud has these simples as homogeneously borderline parts. (The 
xs are homogeneously borderline parts of y iff the xs constitute a homogeneous 
case of borderline composition with respect to y.) I say that things inherit 
properties like mass and location from their homogeneously borderline parts. And 
so composition as I conceive of it is well suited to play the required explanatory 
role.12 
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